Solution In Bosnia Plain To See
By polluting the Bosnia debate with cliches and platitudes, the media and others have sparked an international epidemic of misinformation about that country’s current conflict.
The most debilitating of all the false truisms is that “there are no good options” for resolving Bosnia’s problems.
There are. And the sane and honorable course to pursue is clear: Arm the Bosnians; provide supportive NATO air strikes; and enforce the real United Nations mandate. That mandate is to protect civilians in the designated “safe areas” by excluding heavy weapons from the periphery of the capital and assuring delivery of relief supplies.
Unfortunately, this perfectly appropriate mandate has been fudged and betrayed - by U.N. officials such as Yashushi Akashi and by commanders such as Sir Michael Rose, who have shirked their duty. It’s also been undermined by some Western governments, which refuse to acknowledge that the U.N. charter endows Bosnia - a member nation - with the right of self-defense, making the arms embargo against it illegal.
Something else we “know that ain’t so” is that the Bosnian war is founded on “ancient hatreds.” Apart from the horrors of World War II, which came from without, Bosnia was a fairly peaceful place from the 15th century to 1992. Except when invaded by outside forces - from Croatia in 1941, and from Serbia in 1992 - Bosnian Croats, Muslims and Serbs have cohabited in reasonable harmony. Most could do so again, but only if the Bosnian government can recapture most of the country; unlike Radovan Karadzic’s terrorist regime, the Bosnian government is committed to ethnic equality and tolerance.
Another fallacy about Bosnia is that the United Nations is crippled by an impossible assignment - to maintain a nonexistent peace. Remember, however, that UNPROFOR, now in Bosnia, stands not for U.N. Peacekeepers, but for United Nations Protection Force.
False promises lead to phony dilemmas: in this case, to the paralyzing predictions that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia would precipitate genocide and force a U.N. withdrawal. In truth, the “massive humanitarian catastrophe” that Vice President Al Gore cautions would result from arming the Bosnians is more than 3 years old. And there is no reason why a stronger Bosnian army would drive the United Nations out. After all, it is the Serbs, not the Bosnians, who kill U.N. soldiers.
Besides, even if Britain and France carry out their threat to withdraw their troops, there are several nations ready to replace them. The United Nations can also call upon NATO for supportive airstrikes. Although not indispensable to a Bosnian victory, such legally and morally justified support would shorten the Bosnian conflict and save lives.
Even without U.N. forces, Bosnian troops outnumber the Karadzic forces two to one. Properly equipped with tanks and heavy artillery, this army alone could liberate Sarajevo, and probably the eastern enclaves, too.
Lifting the arms embargo and allowing the Bosnian army to equip itself militarily would accelerate the breaking of the siege of Sarajevo, help the Bosnian government retake at least the 51 percent of the country assigned to it by the Contact Group Plan and enable the Bosnian army to protect the U.N. forces.
This protection would free U.N. forces to serve as true peacekeepers, since a liberated Bosnia would bring genuine peace. U.N. peacekeepers would help the Bosnian government prevent the reprisals against Serbs, which it will desperately want to avoid. They would also facilitate the return of refugees - Croats, Serbs, Jews and Muslims - and distribute humanitarian aid equitably.
Lifting the embargo and establishing an effective U.N. peacekeeping presence would promote difficult but essential reconciliation, which remains the goal of the Bosnian government and the dream of most of its citizens.
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