Man can’t withdraw plea in baby’s death

Robert L. Doney Jr. will get another chance to avoid above-standard punishment for spitefully killing his girlfriend’s baby, but he can’t withdraw his guilty plea, a judge ruled Wednesday.

Doney, 29, pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in March, before a Spokane County Superior Court could begin deliberating his fate. Then, last month, Doney’s court-appointed attorney, Tim Trageser, moved to withdraw the plea on grounds that a state Supreme Court ruling in April undercut his strategy.

Doney was three days into his jury trial when he admitted he deliberately killed Joan Richards’ 2-year-old daughter, Victoria Ramon, on Dec. 26, 2003. He said he shoved the girl into a door frame in the apartment he shared with Richards at 1412 W. Dean because he was angry at Richards.

Trageser said the plea was intended to eliminate the possibility of an above-standard sentence, but the Supreme Court ruling eliminated that possibility without the need for a guilty plea. Doney might as well have taken his chances that the jury would acquit him or convict him of a lesser charge, Trageser argued.

The regretted strategy had been based on confusion created by a U.S. Supreme Court decision last summer that partially invalidated Washington’s sentencing guideline system.

Supreme Court justices said defendants are constitutionally entitled to have a jury decide all facts used to justify above-standard sentences. Previously, Washington judges were allowed to determine aggravating factors that opened the door to extra punishment.

The ruling created chaos in trial courts. Washington’s Supreme Court offered partial clarification on April 14, and the Legislature followed a day later with enactment of legislation creating new procedures for above-standard sentences.

Neither the state Supreme Court ruling nor the new state law clearly addressed Doney’s complicated situation, and Judge Jerome Leveque was asked Wednesday to provide an interpretation.

“It’s frustrating,” said Prosecutor Steve Tucker, who helped Deputy Prosecutor Larry Steinmetz prosecute Doney. “Our Supreme Court ruling has really muddled this whole area. There’s just confusion in the whole court system.”

Tucker and Trageser praised Leveque for fairness in a ruling that failed to satisfy either of them.

For starters, Leveque agreed with Steinmetz and Tucker that Doney’s plea was final. Defendants can’t withdraw guilty pleas to take advantage of a change in the law, he said.

Leveque also agreed with prosecutors that the law establishing new sentencing procedures was retroactive to Doney’s case.

Not only that, Leveque said, but the new procedures are “pretty close” to those he fashioned in the Doney case.

Doney’s trial jury found him guilty of three aggravating factors: deliberate cruelty, multiple injuries and “extreme lack of remorse.” Over Trageser’s objections, Leveque refused to dismiss the jurors when Doney pleaded guilty. He brought them back for a special session to hear some evidence that wasn’t presented during the aborted trial.

On Wednesday, just when it looked as though Leveque was poised to sentence Doney, the judge surprised everyone by stating that he thought he made a mistake by refusing to let Doney give the jury a transcript of a statement of remorse that he made in a pretrial hearing outside the presence of the jury.

At the time, Leveque said Doney would have to testify and subject himself to cross-examination if he wanted to try to convince the jury he was sorry. Doney didn’t want to do that.

Leveque’s ruling would have been correct for trial evidence, but he said Wednesday that he was concerned that the unusual jury session actually was part of a sentencing procedure — and his doubt had to be resolved in Doney’s favor. At sentencing, defendants are allowed to say whatever they want without cross-examination.

So, again over Trageser’s objection, Leveque ruled that Steinmetz and Tucker may move to impanel a new jury to consider aggravating factors. The motion will be heard Aug. 19. If it’s granted, a three-day minitrial will begin on Sept. 6.

Trageser said the minitrial ruling seemed to make sense if the sentencing-law amendment really is retroactive. Retroactivity might cancel out the state Supreme Court’s ruling that judges couldn’t improvise procedures to impanel special juries long after a trial is over — such as when a case is remanded on appeal.

But, Trageser said he doesn’t think the amendment allows judges to impanel a new jury months after a trial.