U.S. officers in Iraq see a long presence

BAGHDAD – U.S. military officials here increasingly envision a “post-occupation” troop presence that neither maintains current levels nor leads to a complete pullout, but aims for a smaller, longer-term force that would remain in the country for years.

This goal, drawn from interviews with more than 20 U.S. military officers and other officials, including senior commanders, strategists and analysts, remains in the early planning stages. It is based on officials’ assessment that a sharp drawdown of troops is likely to begin by the middle of next year, with roughly two-thirds of the force of 150,000 moving out by late 2008 or early 2009. Questions with which officials are grappling are not whether the U.S. presence will be cut, but how quickly, to what level and to what purpose.

A guiding principle, according to two officials here, is the United States should leave Iraq more intelligently than it entered. Military officials, many of whom whould be interviewed only on the condition of anonymity, say they are assessing conditions more realistically, rejecting the “steady progress” mantra of their predecessors and recognizing that short-term political reconciliation in Iraq is unlikely. A reduction of troops, some officials argue, would demonstrate to anti-American factions that the occupation will not last forever, while reassuring Iraqi allies that the United States does not intend to abandon the country.

Logistical realities

The planning is shaped in part by logistical realities. The immediate all-or-nothing debate in Washington over troop levels represents a false dilemma, some military officials said. Even if a total pullout is the goal, it could take a year to execute. One official estimated that with only one major route out of the country – through southern Iraq to Kuwait – it would take at least 3,000 large convoys 10 months to remove military gear and personnel.

“We’re not going to go from where we’re at now to zero overnight,” said Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, U.S. commander for day-to-day operations in Iraq.

U.S. officials also believe that underneath the anti-American rhetoric, even Shiite radicals such as cleric Muqtada al-Sadr don’t really want a pullout, especially while they feel threatened by Sunni insurgents. Also, officials think any Iraqi government will prefer to retain a small U.S. combat force to deter foreign intervention.

Four components

Such a long-term presence would have four major components. The centerpiece would be a reinforced mechanized infantry division of 20,000 soldiers assigned to guarantee security of the Iraqi government and assist Iraqi forces or their U.S. advisers.

Second, a training and advisory force of 10,000 troops would work with Iraqi military and police units. “I think it would be very helpful to have a force here for a period of time to continue to help the Iraqis train and continue to build their capabilities,” Odierno said.

In addition, officials envision a small but significant Special Operations unit focused on fighting the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaida in Iraq. Said a Pentagon official in Iraq: “I think you’ll retain a very robust counterterror capability in this country for a long, long time.”

Finally, the headquarters and logistical elements to command and supply such a force would total more than 10,000 troops, plus civilian contractors.

Going long

The thinking behind this “post-occupation” force, as one official called it, echoes the core conclusion of a Joint Chiefs of Staff planning group that last fall secretly considered three possible courses in Iraq, which it categorized as “go big,” “go home” and “go long.” The group’s recommendation to reshape the U.S. presence in order to “go long” – to remain in Iraq for years with a smaller force – appears to carry weight in Baghdad, where some colonels who led that planning group have been working for Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq since February.

Despite significant differences in the way the war has been discussed in Washington and Baghdad, this plan is emerging as a point of convergence. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and White House spokesman Tony Snow recently indicated the administration is thinking along the same lines as military officials here. Snow has likened the possible long-term mission to the protective role American forces have played in South Korea since the end of the Korean War 54 years ago. And Gates said he is considering a “protracted” U.S. presence in Iraq rather than a withdrawal.

This is hardly the first time officials have considered troop reductions. The original U.S. war plan called for the Army to have 30,000 troops in Iraq by fall 2003; later, top commanders planned for a drawdown in the summer of 2004.

But officials here insist that they are assessing the situation more soberly. For example, when Maj. Gen. Benjamin Mixon, the commander of the 25th Infantry Division, briefed reporters last month, he expressed worries about the performance of Iraqi forces and called the Iraqi government in Diyala province “nonfunctional.” He also said he did not have enough soldiers in Diyala. As one officer here put it, his comments were the sort generals in Iraq once discussed in private.

“I think there’s a greater appreciation for complexity,” said Lt. Col. Brad Brown, a crisis manager for the 1st Cavalry Division, which is overseeing operations in Baghdad.

Officials dismiss the 2004-06 years – when Gen. George Casey was in command – as a fruitless “rush to transition,” as one senior defense official here put it. “The idea was, `As they stand up, we’ll stand down,’ ” he said. That phrase has been all but banished from the Green Zone, as has the notion of measuring U.S. progress in Iraq by the number of Iraqi troops trained or by changes in U.S. casualty counts.

“We had previously ‘transitioned’ ourselves into irrelevance, and the whole thing was going to hell in a handbasket,” a senior official wrote in an e-mail.

Top military officials even say that Iraq’s elections in December 2005 only deepened sectarian divides and contributed to the outbreak of a low-grade civil war in Baghdad last year. “We wanted an election in the worst way, and we got one in the worst way,” a U.S. general here said.

Taking chances

Another major difference is that U.S. officials, both political and military, say they are more willing to take chances. The clearest gamble was the decision in January to move U.S. troops off big, isolated bases and into 60 small outposts across Baghdad. However, the risk-taking also includes reaching out to people once declared enemies of the United States, such as Sadr, the Shiite cleric. “Some people say he might be ready to negotiate behind the scenes,” Odierno said.

In addition, commanders will be forced to lean heavily on Iraqi security forces, whose performance has been mixed at best. The U.S. strategy in Baghdad of “clear, hold and build” calls for clearing neighborhoods of enemy forces, holding them with a sustained military presence while reconstruction efforts get under way. Yet by itself, the United States does not have enough troops to “hold,” so that mission must be executed by Iraqis.

“My nightmare … is a failure of Iraqi security forces, somehow, catastrophically, mixed with a major Samarra-mosque-type catastrophe,” Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, said last week, referring to the February 2006 bombing that sparked renewed civil strife.

Eye on politics

Even as they focus on the realities in Iraq, officials here also keep an eye on Washington politics. Despite the talk in the U.S. capital that Petraeus has only until September to stabilize the situation in Iraq, some officers here quietly suggest they may have until Jan. 20, 2009 – when President Bush leaves office – to put the smaller, revised force in place. They doubt Bush will pull the plug on the war or Congress will force his hand.

Such timing matters because, despite some tactical success in making some Baghdad neighborhoods safer, officials here believe the real test of the U.S. troop increase will be its ability to create space over time for political accommodation among rival Iraqi factions.

Officers agree that hasn’t happened yet – at least not significantly enough to make a difference in Washington.