Musharraf’s interest is his own survival

P akistani President Pervez Musharraf says he imposed military rule to help fight terrorism.

The tragedy for Pakistan – and the danger to us – is that his police and intelligence agents are now beating and jailing judges and lawyers, rather than arresting Islamic radicals. When diplomats asked Musharraf at a meeting in Islamabad on Monday how he planned to crack down on extremists, he railed instead about the sins of Pakistan’s judiciary.

So, when trying to figure out how the United States should now treat Musharraf, start from the premise that his imposition of “emergency rule” had little to do with terrorism. Rather, it was aimed at preventing the Supreme Court from ruling that his re-election to a second term was unconstitutional.

“Musharraf is basically concerned with keeping his own seat,” says Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “He’s riding a tiger and will have grave trouble dismounting.”

It is important to keep this point in mind.

The close U.S. alliance with Musharraf since 2001 has funneled $10 billion in aid to the Pakistani military; it has been based on his help in rooting out elements of al-Qaida and the Taliban. This alliance was rightly seen as crucial, since Pakistan is a breeding ground for Islamists and – unlike Iran – already has nuclear weapons.

But the Pakistani leader’s move is likely to undercut rather than reinforce the fight against al-Qaida and Islamists. He is alienating the very secular political forces he needs as allies in order to make a crackdown on the radicals succeed.

During his eight years in power, Musharraf has failed to check the Islamist threat or meet his pledges to reinstitute full democracy. He said on Saturday that his country wasn’t ready for democracy, and parliamentary elections scheduled for January are now uncertain. The implication is that democratic politics in unstable Muslim countries will boost radical Islamists. Think Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza.

What Musharraf didn’t say is that Islamist parties in Pakistan have never won more than 11 percent of the vote.

The real threat in Pakistan today is not that Islamists will triumph at the polls. The threat is the creeping “Talibanization” of areas of Pakistan, where homegrown jihadis are expanding outward from their bases in tribal areas along the Afghan border.

With militants taking over mosques and suicide bombers attacking within Pakistani cities, popular support for these Islamists is sinking. According to a recent Pew poll on global attitudes, 41 percent of respondents told pollsters in 2004 that suicide bombing was “often or sometimes” justified. This year that figure is down to 9 percent.

Yet Pakistan’s army – which has arrested many members of al-Qaida – has failed to check the growth of local Islamists, or drive al-Qaida from its bases near the border. Many question whether elements within the Pakistani intelligence establishment really want to do so.

Musharraf has also failed to filter Pakistan’s impressive economic growth down to the impoverished rural areas of Pakistan. Nor, despite U.S. aid funds, has the Pakistani leader financed a secular school system to replace the widespread network of religious schools that often produce militant Islamist youth. Public dissatisfaction with corruption within the government has grown, as Musharraf’s popularity has slid.

This Pakistani leader no longer has the credibility with his own people to fight the Islamist threat to his nation. Democracy is not a panacea, and the leaders of Pakistan’s two largest secular parties, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, have many blots on their records. But only an elected leadership can rally the people to support such a fight.

An elected political leadership could make the nationalist case that extremists are endangering the future of Pakistan, as they kidnap soldiers and kill civilians, including scores at a recent political rally. This appeal could stress that fighting terrorism was not a question of appeasing an American ally. An elected government could appeal to the military, says Schaffer, “with an approach that says these Islamists are a threat to the military and the state.”

Moreover, Pakistan has an advantage that is lacking in many Arab Muslim countries: well-developed secular political institutions and parties, a fairly free press, and an independent body of judges. Where such institutions are lacking, a country can choose only between the military and Islamists. That is why it is so dangerous for Musharraf to crush the parties, the courts and the press.

That is also why it is so important for the White House to press Musharraf to hold January elections and to judge him by whether he delivers on democracy and fighting terrorism. If he can’t or won’t, he probably won’t be around much longer – and it’s time to start thinking of Plan B.