Time for Plan B in Pakistan

The next few weeks, or maybe days, will determine the fate of Pakistan – a country containing both Islamist terrorist groups and nukes.

This is the quintessential post-9/11 nightmare. A military dictator losing his grip, with local cells of Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaida poised to take advantage.

No wonder Gen. Pervez Musharraf thought the White House would have to back a dictator over a restoration of constitutional rule. After all, President Bush has ditched his democracy pitch in Arab countries like Egypt, where he’s bought the argument that only a strongman can hold back the Islamists.

But when it comes to Pakistan, that argument doesn’t hold water. Despite $10 billion in U.S. aid, the Taliban and al-Qaida have set up bases in northwest Pakistan; domestic jihadis are setting off suicide bombs and seizing control of peaceful Pakistani villages. With corruption rife, and poverty widespread, Musharraf’s support at home has plummeted.

President Bush seems finally to have grasped that Musharraf has become an obstacle to the anti-terrorist fight. So what can we expect in Pakistan in the near future? And can, or should, the White House try to ease the Pakistani general out?

As to the first question, there is a reasonable way out for Musharraf, but he has refused to grasp it. Time for this option is quickly evaporating. It may be time for the White House to start thinking about Plan B.

The current crisis began when Musharraf declared emergency rule. He was trying to avoid a judgment by Pakistan’s supreme court that his selection by parliament for a second term, while in uniform, was illegal. He could have made a deal with Pakistan’s strongest civilian politician, Benazir Bhutto, that permitted him to remain president, while she became prime minister via elections. The White House tried to facilitate this Plan A.

Instead, he tossed the judges – along with thousands of protesting lawyers and other leaders of civil society – in jail. When Bhutto finally decided to call her followers to the streets on Friday, he put her under temporary house arrest and imprisoned hundreds of her party leaders.

Under U.S. pressure, Musharraf now says he’ll doff his mufti and hold elections. With the judiciary in jail and the media muzzled, few believe him. The key question is whether the army will keep backing the general-president.

Here’s where things get really interesting. Musharraf’s designated successor as military commander if he leaves the army is Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, a man widely admired within the Pakistani military and by members of Pakistani civil society. Kiyani is said to be a “soldier’s soldier” who wants the army out of politics.

U.S. and Pakistani military officials have told the media that Kiyani supports a stronger military effort against Islamic extremists. Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies have traditionally been more focused on India, but Kiyani understands that times are changing.

Kiyani is also said to support a new U.S. plan to train Pakistani troops to fight Islamic extremists in the country’s tribal areas along the Afghan border.

Equally important, his background indicates he would be ready to work with an elected civilian leader like Bhutto, who is favored to win free and fair elections. Bhutto has publicly pledged to fight hard against the Islamists. But some critics argue the army would never cooperate with her.

However, a Pakistani source close to Bhutto told me: “Kiyani is the only general with whom Bhutto has good relations. … He was her deputy military secretary during her first term as prime minister.”

This brings us to Plan B, replacing Musharraf with a new team to handle Pakistan’s security: an elected civilian leader (probably Bhutto) with a strong popular base, and a new army commander, both committed to fighting Pakistan’s internal jihadi scourge.

Can the White House advance such an outcome? Any heavy-handed interference would undercut the legitimacy of a new team.

However, Pakistanis with whom I’ve spoken urge Bush to press more strongly for a return to constitutional rule with genuinely free elections.

They say he should urge Musharraf to step down – or seek re-election as a civilian president.

Should such pressure fail, well-known Pakistani journalist Ahmad Rashid expects civil unrest inside Pakistan to increase; he expects the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaida to take full advantage of such a political vacuum. At some point the army would probably have to intervene and force Musharraf out, but only after months of dangerous chaos. This can be avoided if we can only get to Plan B.