International Agreement On Nuclear Checks Atomic Weaponry Pact To Include Tougher Rules For Site Inspections
Five years after the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program exposed weaknesses in the international inspection system, the United States and more than 60 other countries have agreed on new rules aimed at giving inspectors more information and access to more suspected nuclear sites.
The 35-member board of directors of the International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to approve the new rules at a meeting today in Vienna, senior Clinton administration officials said Wednesday.
According to a cable describing the agreement sent to U.S. diplomatic missions abroad by Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff, “this will represent a major step forward in providing the IAEA with the access and information it needs if it is to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared or clandestine nuclear activities.”
The IAEA is responsible for enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under provisions that signatories are entitled to develop nuclear facilities for civilian use, in exchange for accepting international “safeguards” to ensure they are not developing nuclear weapons.
Iraq and North Korea both created clandestine nuclear weapons programs, using the cloak of IAEA membership to pose as good nuclear citizens while deceiving IAEA inspectors, according to U.S. and United Nations officials.
When the U.N. Security Council imposed tight sanctions on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf war and forced Baghdad to give inspectors access to suspected nuclear sites, they discovered an extensive network of laboratories and nuclear processing facilities that had previously been undetected.
As a result, U.S. officials said, IAEA executive director Hans Blix concluded that the inspection rules needed tightening to give inspectors more access to information, more tools to detect violation and access to more sites suspected of housing nuclear weapons activity.
Under the new protocol, which each member nation will have to approve, signatories will be required to expand the list of information regularly reported to Vienna to include “activities that support the nuclear fuel cycle,” such as the manufacture of zircononium tubes or heavy water. They will also be required to disclose all holdings of uranium and other radioactive materials.
In addition, inspectors will be able to demand access to any building of any known nuclear facility, not just the buildings authorized by the government being inspected. And perhaps most important, officials said, is a new rule authorizing inspectors to conduct “environmental sampling” such as removal of earth or surface swipes to collect material for laboratory testing.
Senior officials acknowledged, however, that the new inspection system does not address the fundamental problem exposed by the Iraqi case: By virtue of signing the agreement, a country acquires a presumption of good faith and desire to play by the rules.