Timetables bad for Iraq democracy

As expected, the Iraqi constitution appears to have been approved. A majority of Iraqis showed themselves to be both courageous and optimistic about the political process. The ruling coalition and the Bush administration are calling it a major victory for democracy. As President Bush may repeat any minute now, “Freedom is on the march” in Iraq.

But the referendum approving a constitution does not end the bloodshed nor give a green light for a speedy U.S. withdrawal.

What’s the point of having a written constitution? The process of developing a constitution can provide a means for hammering out a consensus among disparate groups. A negotiated struggle for power can avoid a bloody battle for power. Meaningful negotiations leading to a consensus that will survive in Iraq’s shattered political life are likely to be prolonged and bitter. And the democracy that emerges may bear little resemblance to the American model.

So why are we pressing so hard for speedy results? Let us not forget the time it took the 13 newly independent colonies of our own country to iron out our differences. It took nine years after we declared our independence in 1776 to come up with a constitution that enabled us to begin an orderly federal union. In so doing, we deferred lots of problems (slavery and women’s rights to name just two). It took another 80 years and one of the world’s bloodiest civil wars to come to a conclusion about the balance of powers between a central government and the individual states.

It takes real arrogance for Americans now to lecture Iraqis on how to do a terribly difficult job in a tolerable manner. We pressure Iraqis to meet a timetable that enables us to declare another victorious milestone. There is a poisonous perception among many Iraqis that the U.S. government views about their constitution and the timetable are dictated by U.S. domestic policies. The perception may be only partly true, but it counts in a big way. It goes along with the notion also dear to the rhetoric of Bush and other U.S. leaders that fighting terrorism in Iraq means we don’t have to fight it here in the United States. This sounds good in Peoria but it strikes a sour note in Baghdad.

We also cannot ignore that a large part of the Sunni Arab minority that did cast a ballot voted against the referendum. Others failed to vote under conditions that were both life threatening and, in their view, did not offer a real chance for their vote to be meaningful. Sunni Arabs feel disenfranchised, cut out of the system. The probability of more insurgent violence is evident.

We also must remember that beyond elections and constitutions, what Iraqis are clamoring for most — and the United States can’t seem to deliver — are basic services and security.

The new Iraqi government needs help to reconstruct the economy, generate employment, deliver basic services and put Iraqi oil production on a sound basis for gradual, steady growth.

During the first year of the occupation, the United States used Iraqi funds for major infrastructure projects, usually awarding contracts to American firms and creating few Iraqi jobs. Now we are moving some $18 billion into the aid pipeline. We need to do better. Regrettably, the lack of basic security and a culture of corruption — on the part of some Iraqi officials and some American contractors — diminish what could be a demonstration of U.S. generosity and concern for the basic needs of the Iraqi people.

It is time for the United States to embrace a few modest but achievable expectations for Iraq. Two dangers face us if we walk away without that.

First, Iraq may become a failed state, plunged into civil war, offering safe havens to international terrorists and a vast pool of embittered, desperate recruits from among the Iraqi population. Think of Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet forces. But Iraq’s strategic location and its superior resources, educated population and knowledge of advanced weaponry make it vastly more dangerous.

Second, a dominant, conservative Shia government in Iraq could fall under the overbearing influence of neighboring Iran that would be hostile to U.S. interests. Iraqis, including the majority Shia population, tend to be highly nationalistic. With a modicum of stability and prosperity they would strongly resist Iranian hegemony. But faced with a committed, incessant insurgency, the potential secession of Kurdistan and an abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces, the demands of survival would greatly increase the influence of Tehran.

There are no silver bullets or fail-safe parachutes. We only mislead Iraqis and ourselves by placing too much weight on timetables and milestones. Democracy is a much bigger challenge than a referendum. The political leaders in the Bush administration may be slowly learning this reality.