Iraq’s official election results were finally released on Friday, more than a month after the ballot. The results should sober anyone who still believes that elections automatically make a country democratic.

In Iraq, religious parties eclipsed secular parties, and sharp sectarian splits will make it difficult for Iraqis to form a government. More violence is likely to emerge from the vote.

Political developments, not military battles, in Baghdad over the next few weeks will determine the final Iraqi outcome. We’ll soon see whether Iraqi Sunnis, who fuel the insurgency, can form a national unity government with Shiites and Kurds, a government that would undercut the insurgency and enable the United States to draw down troops. So far, the prospects look dim.

Indeed, the outcome of the next U.S. elections may hinge on the intricacies of Iraqi politics, about which most Americans know little and often care less. For those who do care, here’s what you should watch for in the next couple of months.

Can Iraqis pick a competent new leader? The United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of Shiite religious parties and groups, won the most seats – 128 out of a 275-member parliament – and must choose a candidate for prime minister. But UIA can’t agree on a choice; the impasse has frozen the political process.

The current prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, has proved a disappointing failure at the helm. Ministries don’t function, corruption is rampant and civil war threatens. A far more promising choice is the capable and moderate Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi from the largest Shiite party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

But al-Jaafari is fighting tooth and nail to keep his post, with the support of the radical and anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who controls a sizeable bloc of UIA seats. The ultimate Shiite arbiter, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has declined to throw his weight behind either man. A third Shiite, the weak Nadim al-Jabiri of the Islamist Fadhila party, is positioning himself as a compromise candidate; he would not be able to run the country competently.

So watch for whether al-Jaafari or Mahdi wins the endorsement to lead; if Mahdi loses, Iraq will continue to drift toward civil war.

Can Iraqis form a national unity government? Ruled for decades by a dictator, Iraqi sects have little experience with compromise.

Much of the Sunni minority, long in power under Saddam, rejects the idea of rule by Shiites, who believe in a different line of succession to the Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis took part in December elections after boycotting an earlier ballot, but they have trouble accepting the results, which gave their parties only 55 seats. They cling to the idea that they are a numerical majority, although the balloting clearly showed they make up only about 20 percent of the population.

Shiites understand the advantage of reconciliation with Sunnis. But they are angry that the newly elected Sunnis don’t reject Sunni terrorist killings of Iraqi civilians. They are unwilling to give Sunnis an exaggerated share of cabinet posts, oil revenues or power.

Shiite leaders have turned down Sunni demands for a strong central government that controls oil revenues. The top Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, has rescinded previous offers to consider constitutional changes.

Watch for signs of Shiite compromise on revising the constitution – under U.S. pressure. Also watch to see how many cabinet seats Shiites are willing to promise Sunnis.

And watch to see whether, as a quid pro quo, some Sunni leaders are willing to condemn attacks by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi against Iraqi civilians and volunteer their fellow Sunni tribesmen to fight in the Iraqi army against terrorists. (Note: Two Sunni sheikhs who did volunteer their men were recently assassinated by insurgents.)

Can U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad save the day? Iraqis from all sides say the best hope for a national unity government lies with the personal diplomacy of Khalilzad. An Afghan American who understands tribal culture, Khalilzad has been indefatigable in visiting leaders of every faction and trying to persuade them to compromise.

“The Americans started to understand something in Iraq only when Khalilzad came,” a senior Iraqi official told me by phone from Baghdad. “Before him their understanding was zero, and they antagonized people. Khalilzad is accepted by all sides as someone who understands them.” So watch for whether Khalilzad can press Shiites to pick a viable candidate and whether he can find a way to draw Shiites and Sunnis into a unity government. But keep in mind the last caution the Iraqi official offered: “I’m afraid Khalilzad came too late.”