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Spokane, Washington  Est. May 19, 1883

Handling of nuclear weapons critiqued

Peter Spiegel Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON – The U.S. military has lost focus on its nuclear weapons mission and has suffered a sharp decline in nuclear expertise, factors that may have contributed to a mishap last year in which a B-52 bomber unknowingly carried six nuclear warheads across the country, according to two new independent reviews.

Both studies found that levels of nuclear training and alertness at the Air Force slipped after the end of the Cold War. But one of the reports, compiled by outside experts, was much more critical, saying accidents far worse than the errant B-52 flight could occur without immediate changes in nuclear procedures.

“The Task Force and several of the senior DoD (Department of Defense) people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable,” said the report compiled by an outside panel chaired by retired Air Force Gen. Larry D. Welch.

Both reviews were ordered in the wake of the August bomber flight, in which Air Force weapons officers accidentally loaded the B-52 in North Dakota with nuclear weapons. The bombs were flown to an air base in Louisiana the following day, where they were eventually discovered and belatedly secured.

Dozens of officers have been either disciplined or relieved of command, but the Welch report’s finding raises new questions about whether failures within the Air Force were more systemic than originally believed. The first Air Force investigation into the incident, completed in October, pinned much of the blame on individual officers at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.

Neither Welch’s study nor an internal Air Force review, conducted by Maj. Gen. Polly A. Peyer, found any failures in the security of U.S. nuclear weapons. But at a Capitol Hill hearing, Welch testified that the military units responsible for handling the bombs are not properly inspected and, as a result, may not be ready to perform their missions.

“We have uncovered no safety issues,” Welch said. “If you look at all the areas and all the ways that we have to store and handle these weapons in order to perform the mission, it just requires, we believe, more resources and more attention than they’re getting.”

Both studies could put new pressure on Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff, to reorganize the service’s nuclear forces.

After the Cold War, the once-vaunted Strategic Air Command, which controlled all Air Force nuclear weapons, was dismantled. The military’s nuclear missiles were assigned to a division responsible for operations in space and its nuclear bombers were moved to Air Combat Command, which also includes non-nuclear fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.

Although the internal Air Force review has not been made public, a copy of its executive summary obtained by the Los Angeles Times asserts that the split organization has led to fragmentation of policies and accountability, without a single commander responsible for nuclear missions.

In an interview, Peyer, who headed the 30-person internal review, said her report does not specifically recommend recreating the Strategic Air Command, and warned against attempting to go back to Cold War polices with a nuclear force that is now much smaller than in the 1980s.