No Room For Ambiguity In Bosnia
In announcing the Bosnian peace accord, President Clinton declared that the role of U.S. troops in implementing this agreement will be “a clear, limited, achievable mission” with minimal risks. I think that such a minimalist mission - but only such a minimalist mission - can be sold to the American public and Congress.
But before we can judge whether that is really the mission Clinton is dispatching U.S. forces on, we need to know not only the fine print of this agreement, but what has not been printed at all, only whispered to the parties in the hallways of Dayton. There was obviously a lot of 11th-hour horse-trading.
When American diplomats were negotiating the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, they accepted a lot of ambiguity in the accord and told different things to different people, but that was in order to get U.S. troops out. It would be very worrying if we have adopted the same sort of diplomacy in Dayton to get U.S. troops in.
Here are the questions Congress should be asking:
Initial reports suggest that this deal came about as a result of a Croatian-Serbian squeeze play on the Bosnian Muslims. And no wonder. Croatia and Serbia, the two big powers in this theater, got virtually everything they wanted out of this deal - international recognition for the slices of Bosnia they have seized. It is the Muslims who wanted a reunified Bosnia but got far less. The question is: What has the United States promised the Muslims in terms of military support and training for their army? And does Washington have the backing of the Serbs and the Croats for playing the role of peacekeeper with one hand while arming the Muslims with the other?
The United States has to be very careful that it is not drawn into a process whereby the Muslims use the U.S. Army to get for them on the ground in Bosnia what they could not get at the negotiating table in Dayton. This is also a crucial point to sort out with our allies, because the Germans, British and French have never liked the idea of the United States upgrading the Muslim army while also serving as peacekeepers. Do Paris, Bonn, London and Washington share the same objectives under the NATO umbrella?
This agreement states that while Bosnia is being divided into self-governing Serbian and Croatian-Muslim states, these two halves are supposed to be united under an “effective” umbrella central government, central bank, national parliament and constitutional court. Also all refugees are to be allowed to return home. What role will the U.S. military play in achieving those difficult goals? What if the Serbs and Croats drag their feet in participating in these federal institutions or in letting refugees return?
How will we know when this mission has succeeded? Will we declare victory and bring the troops home only after all-Bosnian elections and the refugees return to their original homes? Will we declare victory and bring the troops home after 12 months in which we have given the parties breathing space to solidify peace, whether they have done so or not? Or will we declare victory after we have built up the Muslim army enough so that there will be a stable balance of power among the three parties? There has always been a trade-off in the Balkans between stability and justice. Which is our objective?
Finally, a question for Clinton: In traveling around this country, I am sure you have noticed that not only is there no public enthusiasm for this mission, there is virtually no public understanding of it. Even those inclined to support you on this aren’t quite sure why.
The stakes for you could not be higher. If this peace mission succeeds, your whole foreign policy will be judged very differently than it has been up to now. But if you can’t get the public’s support for this mission, or if this mission fails on the ground because it turns out not to have been either limited or clearly defined, everything else you’ve achieved in foreign policy will be forgotten.
Putting 20,000 U.S. troops into a risky peacekeeping role in the Balkans, with relations with NATO and Russia on the line, is a major foreign policy endeavor. To make it a success requires you to exhibit something that you have never exhibited before - a sustained, personal involvement with foreign policy. That is the only way you can sell this.
But first, you have to tell us exactly what you’re selling.
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