One Nation Cannot Dominate Policy

Recent nuclear tests in the South Asian subcontinent have shaken the international community. Their consequences are much more than just the start of a regional nuclear arms race.

Some people are already saying that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is now a lost cause. That may turn out to be true, but only if the policy makers of major powers confine themselves to short-term reaction, without drawing appropriate conclusions.

But some of the suggestions being made in the wake of the tests could lead to exactly the wrong conclusions. Some see them as a pretext for refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and even abandoning negotiations on reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

There is no doubt in my mind that by their recent actions India and Pakistan have not strengthened their security. To the contrary, by launching the mechanism of mutual threats they have added a strong element of unpredictability to the already difficult security equation in the subcontinent.

Any perceived gain in status or “clout” is a delusion, too. The euphoria will pass, but the angry global reaction will continue to cause both countries serious problems, not only international but domestic as well.

And yet, one must recognize the validity of much of the criticism directed at the five nuclear powers, particularly the United States and Russia.

After all, it has long been obvious that the NonProliferation Treaty is bound to be shaky unless there is real movement toward nuclear disarmament. Yet, of late, both the United States and Russia have been making it increasingly clear that they intend to rely for their defense on nuclear weapons, advanced delivery systems and anti-ballistic missiles. As was to be expected, the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty failed to lock in the status quo or to increase the treaty’s credibility and effectiveness.

We have to face the truth today: That status quo has now been broken.

Economic sanctions offer no solution. Indeed, as we have seen, they can cause resentment and bitterness and make the situation even more difficult. Nevertheless, the international community cannot afford to ignore the contempt with which it has been treated by New Delhi and Islamabad.

More important, however, is to seek constructive courses of action, primarily within the United Nations. Only a serious, no-nonsense dialogue can persuade India and Pakistan that they must cease the nuclear escalation and adhere to non-proliferation and comprehensive test ban treaties.

But the other nuclear powers too must do a lot. It can no longer be business as usual. They must act concretely to prove that they are serious about nuclear disarmament.

I would also urge greater attention to the problem of nuclear delivery systems. The United States and Russia are observing the treaty banning intermediate and shorter-range missiles that President Reagan and I signed in 1987. Negotiations should now begin on enlarging this treaty to include other countries, since missiles with a range of about 300 miles to 3,500 miles are particularly dangerous on a regional level.

I want to recall what happened in 1991, when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, on the basis of an informal arrangement, to drastically reduce their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. Similar steps today, taken unilaterally, without engaging in protracted negotiations, would go a long way toward normalizing the situation and persuading people that world leaders are capable of acting to assure their security.

Finally, I have to put the actions of India and Pakistan within the overall context of the world’s post-Cold War evolution. It has been adversely affected by the mistaken conclusion that one side won the Cold War and thus secured for itself the right to unconstrained leadership.

Whatever the intentions were, things went wrong. Over the past years, all kinds of things have been tried - but little or nothing was ever done to strengthen the United Nations, or to coordinate on a regular and systematic basis the nuclear policies of the existing powers and seriously consult with the threshold states.

It should now be clear that in this as in other matters, one power center is simply not capable of being the sole decision maker and regulator. This is a lesson to be learned if we are to have fewer unpleasant surprises in the future.