Don’T Stop Project Because It’S Hard

Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time. Nevertheless, the federal government has had to abandon its plan for a “privatized” contract for the construction and operation of a factory crucial to cleaning up the radioactive mess at Hanford.

The resulting train wreck raises two issues:

1. Can the Energy Department still comply with the imminent deadlines in its legally enforceable Hanford cleanup contract?

2. Do Congress and the administration realize that Hanford cleanup is mandatory - even if it becomes painfully expensive, as it quite possibly will?

It was mainly a legitimate cost concern that led current plans to collapse. Over the past five months BNFL Inc., chosen to carry out a “privatized” contract for the cleanup plant, revised its cost estimates from $6.9 billion to $8 billion to $13 billion and finally, $15.2 billion. Those exploding costs pointed to obvious management deficiencies. Indeed, they are outrageous enough to hint that BNFL may not have wanted the job under the privatized terms, after all.

A privatized contract would have forced BNFL, not the government, to absorb future cost increases once the price was locked in place later this summer.

Now, the Energy Department has killed the deal with BNFL and embarked on a fast-track process to issue a more traditional contract, in which the government would shoulder unexpected cost increases. It is not yet clear whether the department will go back to BNFL or seriously entertain bids from interested competitors. However, a spirited bidding competition would add some fresh options, possibly blowing away the cloud of suspicion that hangs over BNFL’s maneuvers.

Meanwhile, it ought to remain clear that cleanup simply must occur. The plant in question would convert radioactive liquids, now in leaky underground tanks, into glass logs for permanent storage in Nevada. To leave those liquids in the ground, where the risks include leaks, explosions and tank collapses, is indefensible. To build new temporary storage tanks while the government dithers about a permanent solution would waste dollars and prolong the accident risks.

The disposal technology itself has been studied thoroughly and approved. Some of the engineering work for the vitrification plant has been completed and should be put to use, whoever the contractor turns out to be.

It is essential that the cleanup be governed with awareness of past abuses. Contracts should feature rigorous scrutiny, safeguards against price gouging and powerful incentives to contain costs. But let it also be recognized that this cleanup, like the nuclear arms race that created the mess, will be more complicated and expensive than anyone now anticipates. The difficulties of the undertaking must not stop the federal government from doing its duty.