Nuclear plants won’t get plane defense

WASHINGTON – Making nuclear power plants crash-proof to an airliner attack by terrorists is impracticable and it’s up to the military to avert such an assault, the government said Monday.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a revised security policy, directed nuclear plant operators to focus on preventing radiation from escaping in case of such an attack and to improve evacuation plans to protect public health and safety.

“The active protection against airborne threats is addressed by other federal organizations, including the military,” the NRC said in a statement.

The agency rejected calls by some nuclear watchdog groups for the government to establish firm no-fly zones near reactors or for plant operators to build “lattice-like” barriers to protect reactors or be required to have anti-aircraft weapons on site to shoot down an incoming plane.

The NRC, in a summary of the mostly secret security plan, said that such proposals were examined but that it was concluded the “active protection” against an airborne threat rests with organizations such as the military or the Federal Aviation Administration.

It said that various mitigation strategies required of plant operators – such as radiation protection measures and evacuation plans – “are sufficient to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety” in case of an airborne attack.

The commission unanimously approved the plan, which has been the subject of discussions for 15 months, in a 5-0 vote at a brief meeting.

The defense plan, formally known as the Design Basis Threat, spells out what type of attack force the government believes might target a commercial power reactor and what its operator must be capable of defending against.

While details are sketchy because of security concerns, the plan requires defense against a relatively small force, perhaps no more than a half-dozen attackers, but that could come from multiple directions including by water and could include suicide teams.

The plan, which formally approves many of the procedures that have long been in place, reflects the concerns raised by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. It also includes measures to address cyber attacks, according to the NRC.

Some members of Congress and nuclear watchdog groups have said the requirements fall short of what is needed, given what was learned by the Sept. 11 attacks on the twin towers in New York and at the Pentagon.

These critics have argued that defenders of a reactor should be ready to face as many as 19 attackers – as was the case on Sept. 11 – and expect them to have rocket-propelled grenades, so-called platter explosive charges and .50-caliber armor-piercing ammunition.

The NRC does not assume such weapons being used and rejected the idea of a 19-member attack force, maintaining that the Sept. 11 attacks actually were four separate attacks, each by four or five terrorists.