Arrow-right Camera
The Spokesman-Review Newspaper
Spokane, Washington  Est. May 19, 1883

Pushing the envelope leads to drone crashes

A pilot at Kandahar Air Field uses a camera pod to remotely steer a Reaper aircraft back into base after a mission.
David Zucchino Los Angeles Times

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan – The U.S. military often portrays its drone aircraft as high-tech marvels that can be operated seamlessly from thousands of miles away. But Pentagon accident reports reveal that the pilotless aircraft suffer from frequent system failures, computer glitches and human error.

Design and system problems were never fully addressed in the haste to push the fragile plane into combat over Afghanistan shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks more than eight years ago. Air Force investigators continue to cite pilot mistakes, coordination snafus, software failures, outdated technology and inadequate flight manuals.

Thirty-eight Predator and Reaper drones have crashed during combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and nine more during training on bases in the U.S. – with each crash costing between $3.7 million and $5 million.

Accident rates are dropping, but the raw numbers of accidents are increasing as use of the aircraft skyrockets, according to Air Force safety experts.

But no lives are lost, and for some experts that’s the most important point: For them, drones are the vanguard of a new type of remote warfare that minimizes the risk to U.S. personnel. The number of crashes, however, illustrates how quickly the unmanned aircraft have become an essential part of U.S. combat operations. At least 38 drones are in flight over Afghanistan and Iraq at any given time.

The Air Force acknowledges that armed drones were not ready when first deployed as the U.S. military geared up for the campaign to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan. Most weapons systems are tested and refined for years. Unarmed drones had been in use since the mid-1990s, but the first armed version went to war just nine months after it was retrofitted.

It was pushed into use after a Predator successfully launched Hellfire antitank missiles at the Naval Air Weapons testing range at China Lake in January 2001.

Technicians bought off-the-shelf equipment at Radio Shack and Best Buy to build a system to allow ground forces to see the drones’ video feeds. At least one drone crashed because it had no fuel gauge, and the aircraft ran out of fuel.

Even now, the planes are not designed for the amount of use they’re getting, their defenders say. The 27-foot Predators and 36-foot Reapers operate under conditions that put enormous stress on the light drones.

“These airplanes are flying 20,000 hours a month, OK?” said retired Rear Adm. Thomas J. Cassidy Jr., president of the aircraft systems group at General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, which makes Predators and Reapers.

“That’s a lot of flying,” Cassidy said. “Some get shot down. Some run into bad weather. Some, people do stupid things with them. Sometimes they just run them out of gas.”

The drones flew 185,000 hours over Afghanistan and Iraq in 2009, more than triple the number of hours flown in 2006.

Air Force officials say design and training improvements have lowered the Predator’s accident rate. Accident rates per 100,000 hours dropped to 7.5 for the Predator and 16.4 for the Reaper last year, according to the Air Force. The Predator rate is comparable to that of the F-16 fighter at the same stage, Air Force officers say, and just under the 8.2 rate for small, single-engine private airplanes flown in the U.S.