Rumsfeld wanted Iraq shift

WASHINGTON – Two days before he resigned from the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent to the White House a classified memo recommending “a major adjustment” in Iraq strategy and acknowledging slow progress there.

“Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough,” Rumsfeld wrote in the Nov. 6 memo.

Rumsfeld has made similar comments in public about insufficient progress in Iraq, both before and immediately after his resignation on Nov. 8.

What is most revealing about the memo, however, is the series of 21 bulleted options Rumsfeld lays out regarding Iraq strategy for President Bush – options that, while Rumsfeld’s own ideas, grew out of several weeks of discussions of alternative strategies with U.S. military commanders, according to a senior defense official.

Michael O’Hanlon, a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution, said he thought the revelation of the memo would undercut any attempt by President Bush to defend anything resembling a “stay the course” policy in Iraq.

“When you have the outgoing secretary of defense, the main architect of Bush’s policy, saying it’s failing, that puts a lot more pressure on Bush,” he said.

The memo makes clear that Rumsfeld understood acutely the political implications of changing strategy.

“Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis,” he wrote. “This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not ‘lose.’ “

Similarly, Rumsfeld advocated announcing “a set of benchmarks” for the Iraqi government – to “get them moving,” he added parenthetically – as well as to “reassure” the U.S. public that progress can be made.

The existence of the memo was reported Saturday night by the New York Times, which posted it on its Web site.

Asked about the Rumsfeld memo, White House spokeswoman Eryn Witcher said: “The president has said he’s been dissatisfied with the progress in Iraq, so the right thing to do is re-evaluate our tactics. There are a number of reviews under way, and the president is open to listening to a wide array of options.”

Rumsfeld’s ideas did not depart radically from the strategies emerging so far from the bipartisan Iraq Study Group or from other ongoing military and governmental Iraq policy reviews initiated in recent weeks.

For example, Rumsfeld called for significantly increasing the number of U.S. military trainers embedded with Iraqi forces, and, in a twist, also for “a reverse embeds program” that would place Iraqi soldiers with American squads, partly to boost the Arabic-language skills of U.S. troops.

Several options Rumsfeld raised involve withdrawing or pulling back the 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq as a way to pressure the Iraqi government to take greater responsibility for its security. This idea, favored by many Democrats in Congress, had not been publicly embraced by Rumsfeld to such a degree. Still, Rumsfeld wrote that he opposed setting a firm withdrawal date.

Another option would be to keep in Iraq only U.S. Special Operations forces – to hunt for al-Qaida – and other U.S. troops necessary to support Iraqi forces with air power, intelligence and other logistics.

Rumsfeld also proposed withdrawing U.S. forces “from vulnerable positions – cities, patrolling, etc.” and creating a quick-reaction force to back up Iraqi troops. In addition, he suggested accelerating the consolidation of U.S. bases in Iraq, from the current 55 to between 10 and 15 by April, and then five by next July.

In several instances, Rumsfeld suggests using the security provided by U.S. troops in a carrot-and-stick approach – providing security only for provinces and cities that fully cooperate with U.S. forces.

In contrast, the defense secretary characterizes as “less attractive” options that involve U.S. troop increases – such as surging U.S. forces into Baghdad, or substantially increasing the number of American combat brigades in Iraq. The only place he recommends a U.S. troop increase is along Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran.

People in Washington familiar with the workings of the Pentagon and the media were suspicious of the motives for the leak. “It’s probably an attempt to dress up his legacy,” said one government official, who declined to be identified because, he said, “it would complicate my current position.”