The nuclear deal reached last week during President Bush’s visit to India unleashed a predictable wave of criticism. From editorial and op-ed pages to Congress, led by the left but supported on the right, the administration has been assailed for making a bad bargain.

The attacks reflect the view of the non-proliferation lobby – the experts and policymakers whose central concern is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. I share their aim. But American arguments against the India deal are misleading and only expose the deep contradictions, if not hypocrisy, of our own nuclear policies.

There are two main criticisms of the agreement – first, it undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, and second, it permits, even encourages, India to expand its nuclear weapons production.

The NPT issue is particularly sensitive at a time when the international community is trying to persuade Iran to give up certain nuclear technologies it fears are part of a secret bomb program.

The NPT created two sets of global rules – one for the five recognized nuclear weapons powers (United States, China, Russia, Britain and France) and another for everyone else. The Five, for example, allow only “voluntary” international safeguards on their civilian nuclear facilities. They have no obligation to open their military programs to any kind of scrutiny. The NPT places no real limits on their arsenals, other than a vague commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons.

The rest must open their programs fully to international inspection and agree never to build bombs. In exchange, they gain access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Iran – and North Korea – made that bargain and can be held to account for breaking its rules. India consistently regarded that as an unequal tradeoff and never signed the NPT – neither did Pakistan and Israel, two other nuclear weapons states.

India’s nuclear program is the product of decades of largely indigenous effort, driven by its security needs. It is not a case of secretive proliferation in violation of the NPT.

The deal with India turns the Five into Six. It treats India as a de facto member of the inner club, including membership in the organization to control nuclear exports. In removing existing U.S. restrictions on transfer of nuclear energy technology, it treats India no differently than China.

That does not weaken the NPT – it strengthens it. It brings it more into accord with reality and gives India a stake in a system it had previously rejected as unfair.

The critics are right that the deal enables India to expand its production of fissile materials to make nuclear warheads. Some eight of India’s 22 power reactors will remain outside of international controls, along with a new breeder reactor. The Indians feel their nuclear arsenal may not be large enough to deter a nuclear first strike by Pakistan or China in the future.

Again, this simply treats India like the Five. Non-proliferation experts claim that unlike India, however, the Five have halted their production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. This is misleading.

The Five have massive stockpiles of fissile material built up during the Cold War. “If I’ve got a full pantry, it’s easy for me to swear off trips to the supermarket,” says Michael Levi, an arms control expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Moreover, the United States has embarked on a new program to rebuild its nuclear weapons production capability, including new facilities to produce plutonium cores for warheads and to assemble them.

India has agreed to back a global pact to cut off fissile material production. But the Bush administration does not support a treaty that would actually verify this is taking place. And the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that would permanently halt any new testing of nuclear weapons.

A Congress that can support those policies is hardly in a position to challenge this agreement with India. Rather than block the U.S.-India deal, it makes more sense to improve it. This could include agreements for cooperation between the two countries to ensure the safety and security of nuclear facilities, including those for military purposes, suggests Stanford professor Scott Sagan, a leading expert on nuclear safety and non-proliferation. “Reducing the risk of terrorist theft of nuclear materials or weapons in India would also help protect the U.S.,” argues Sagan.

Beyond that, the Six acknowledged nuclear powers should begin seriously to fulfill their part of the NPT bargain – to cap fissile material production, to ban nuclear testing, and to radically reduce stored arsenals of nuclear weapons and materials.