Russians had role

WASHINGTON – Russian diplomats passed detailed, though sometimes inaccurate, tactical information about American troop movements to senior Iraqi officials even as U.S. troops closed in on Baghdad during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, according to Iraqi intelligence documents captured by the U.S. military that raise new questions about Moscow’s role.

One of the documents, which purports to be a summary of a letter sent to Saddam Hussein’s office by a Russian official, claims that Moscow had “sources inside the American Central Command in Doha” – the U.S. military’s headquarters during the war – which Russia used to convey American intentions and troop movements to Baghdad.

Russia had well-known and extensive diplomatic and economic ties to Baghdad prior to the U.S.-led invasion and occasionally clashed with the Bush administration during the international debate over how to deal with Saddam’s regime.

But the documents, made public in a study of the Iraqi military’s decision-making during the war that was released by the Pentagon on Friday, are the first to assert that Russia actively passed sensitive military intelligence to Baghdad during the war itself.

The disclosures could jeopardize U.S.-Russian relations more than any single event since the end of the Cold War, analysts said. While cautioning that Moscow may have an explanation, the analysts noted that some of the details were so sensitive that they would be difficult for the government of President Vladimir V. Putin to justify.

“This is one step short of firing upon us themselves with Russian equipment,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a military analyst with the Brookings Institute. “It’s actively aiding and abetting the enemy tactically. It’s hard to get more unfriendly than that.”

Media officials at the Russian Embassy did not return calls seeking comment. An official who answered the phone in the military attache’s office in the embassy said he was unfamiliar with the report.

One of the most sensitive revelations, which came in a captured letter detailing Russian intelligence on American troop movements, accurately informed Baghdad that U.S. forces were massing south of a narrow passage near the southern city of Karbala.

The April 2, 2003, letter, which was reportedly passed through Moscow’s ambassador to Baghdad, informed Iraqi leaders that “the heaviest concentration of troops (12,000 troops plus 1,000 vehicles) was in the vicinity of Karbala.” The 3rd Infantry Division, the main thrust of the U.S. invasion, eventually captured Baghdad by pushing through the Karbala gap just days later.

Other information provided by the Russians, however, was wildly inaccurate, particularly an assertion made both in the April 2 letter and an earlier March 24 document that the main American offensive would come from the western desert, including a major attack from Jordanian soil.

Kevin Wood, a retired Army officer who served as the senior researcher and chief author of the study, said he was surprised when he learned of the Russian actions, and noted that while there was little corroboration of the contacts beyond the documents themselves, his team had no reason to doubt their authenticity.

But Frederick Kagan, a Russia and defense expert at the American Enterprise Institute, said the actions would not be out of keeping with other efforts by Moscow at the time to advance Iraq’s cause internationally.

“We knew the Russians were opposed to the sanctions; we knew they opposed the war,” Kagan said. “I’m not terribly surprised.”

Analysts also said it would be important to learn whether upper levels of the Russian government were involved with the Iraqi communications and added that the signals were more likely to have come from diplomatic and intelligence agents in the region rather than from Moscow.

In addition, it remains unclear how much of the information was genuine intelligence and how much involved passing on educated guesswork about American intentions, the likes of which was occurring simultaneously on internationally broadcast media accounts featuring retired military experts.

Regardless of the information’s accuracy and potential for damage, however, analysts said the revelations are likely to further undermine transAtlantic efforts to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, where Russia has taken a leading diplomatic role.

“I think we have to assume that we can’t trust the Russians to be impartial or even honest with us,” said Kagan. “The Russians have ties with the Iranians that are also very worrying.”

Apart from the Russian revelations, the 210-page U.S. report on Iraq’s actions during the war – compiled by staff at the Pentagon’s Joint Forces Command after interviewing more than 100 former Iraqi officials and sifting through a half million document files – contains the most detailed accounts to date of Saddam’s thinking as U.S. and allied troops massed on his border and eventually pushed into Iraq.

The authors depict Saddam as excessively worried about an internal coup – so much so that he frequently viewed a repeat of the 1991 Shiite uprising in the south as more of a threat than the advancing coalition forces – even when they were already on the outskirts of Baghdad. He continued to make tactical military decisions based on that fear until the very last days of his regime.

“There were no national plans to transition to a guerrilla war in the event of a military defeat,” the report found. “Nor, as their world crumbled around them, did the regime appear to cobble together such plans.”

The report’s authors said they were not able to interview Saddam, and most of the discussions with former Iraqi leaders occurred before the deposed president was captured. They found Hussein and his top commanders to be badly out of touch with reality, both before the war and during the rapid advance of coalition forces on Baghdad.

Hussein and his inner circle were fed a steady diet of lies – mainly overly optimistic assessments about Iraq’s military capabilities – from subordinates who feared they would pay with their lives for speaking the truth.

The misinformation also flowed down through the ranks. The report cites an April 6 memo from the Ministry of Defense telling subordinate units that “We are doing great” and reminding officers to “avoid exaggerating the enemy’s abilities.”

The scope of the military defeat “only slowly dawned on Saddam and those around him,” the report said. During meetings in the final days before his regime’s collapse, Saddam’s tone was that of a man “who had lost his will to resist,” and “knew the regime was coming to an end,” according to Tariq Aziz, the former Iraqi vice president who was one of 23 senior members of the regime interviewed by U.S. military researchers.