On the seventh anniversary of Sept. 11, we once again mourn; politicians will intone about fighting the war on terrorism. Some will even talk about World War IV.

But, in a series of interviews with top terrorism experts, I found surprising accord on the need to redefine the problem. “The jargon is that it is a global war on terrorism,” says Richard A. Clarke, former counterterrorism czar to Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush 43. “That is very misleading. If you do not understand what the problem is, then your solution is not going to work.”

Clarke and others argue that the conflict with jihadi terrorists “is not global,” but exists largely within the Islamic world and part of Europe. “It is not a war, with a few exceptions,” he continues. “And it is really not on terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic.”

The constant repetition of the mantra “war on terrorism” implies we are fighting a single enemy, like the Soviets, in a struggle that can be won on the field of battle. Not so.

Clark defines the struggle as one against “a small, deviant minority strain in Islam” that wants to replace existing governments in Muslim countries with fundamentalist regimes. We aren’t fighting against states, but against “non-state actors.”

Islamist jihadis must be confronted in different ways, depending on where they are. The situation differs greatly in, say, the Philippines, from in Pakistan or Europe.

We must be wary of letting the war analogy blind us to the essentials. The battle depends more on winning a battle of ideas than a war fought with guns.

Yes, guns are needed to stop the Taliban from retaking Afghanistan and prevent jihadis from re-emerging in Iraq. But Iraq went sour because of misguided U.S. policies that created fertile ground for jihadis; military action often worsened the problem. The key to reviving Iraq was not U.S. guns.

The Iraq situation shifted because Sunnis turned against militant forces they once supported. Al-Qaida’s viciousness turned off the Sunni population and undercut the ideas they propagated. Gen. David Petraeus took advantage of the jihadis’ errors; he helped Iraqi Sunnis help themselves by driving al-Qaida out of their turf.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, the fight against jihadis will depend on whether the local population rejects them. NATO troops can help, but only if local fighters take the lead. In Pakistan, where the population rejects American involvement, open use of U.S. troops is bound to boomerang.

Indeed, the “war on terrorism” mantra plays into the jihadi strategy. The Taliban and al-Qaida want to lure America into acts that turn local people against them, like bombing civilians. They want to suck America into “bleeding wars,” says South Asia expert Bruce Reidel, like the Afghan mujaheddin did to the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Avoiding this trap, say the experts, will involve a strategy far more complex than seeking military “victory.” It will require training local forces, and using U.S. military assets sparingly to avoid harming civilians. It will involve economic aid distributed at local levels to dissuade youths from hiring out to militant groups.

And the struggle will involve a war of ideas – including a major effort to publicize al-Qaida atrocities. Al-Qaida runs a massive Internet operation trumpeting its triumphs against the infidels; we need as big an operation, in many languages, laying out the group’s hideous crimes against Muslims.

What’s most essential is for Americans to understand that the surge of jihadi terrorists is a historical phenomenon; born of the alienation created by globalization. Yes, the elimination of Osama bin Laden would be a huge psychological blow. Yet the phenomenon may take years to abate.

In the meantime, better intelligence and close international cooperation may be as essential as troops. So will coordination among U.S., European and Russian officials on thwarting the sale of fissile material or nuclear weapons to terrorists.

Al-Qaida expert Peter Bergen believes the terrorist threat to Western countries will come from Europe. Alienated young educated Muslims in Europe were behind the 9/11 attacks, and subsequent bombings in Europe. Other planned attacks in Europe have been foiled since, along with efforts to sell stolen fissile material that could be used for terrorist bombs.

So forget the World War IV mantra with its false aura of tank battles. This fight requires smart long-term strategy, not mass mobilization. Americans face a long slog at many levels before the jihadi phenomenon fades.