A series of botched military operations led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which dramatically overhauled the nation’s armed forces. A lack of coordination was the common thread running through the failed attempt to rescue hostages in Iran, protect Marines in Lebanon and head off friendly fire deaths in Grenada.

Reform required each branch of the military to cede power, and it elevated the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to role of presidential adviser. Since then, the armed forces have responded with efficient operations in Panama, the Balkans and two wars in the Persian Gulf.

The nation’s intelligence operation needs similar reforms, and a good starting point for discussion is the 9-11 commission’s bipartisan recommendations. Throughout its report, the commission shows the drawbacks of the current splintered system that has 15 agencies charged with gathering information and either being unwilling or unable to share it.

Just as the military has established central commands in the Gulf wars, the intelligence community needs a central command in the war on terror. To that end, the commission recommends establishing a national intelligence director who would control the budget, set quality standards and be a part of the executive branch.

President Bush announced that he was endorsing the commission’s recommendations but rejected those major guidelines. To this day, the White House hasn’t given a detailed explanation for why the commission’s model is flawed.

The commission says the president’s plan falls short, and members have traveled the country campaigning for greater change. Former Washington Sen. Slade Gorton, a panel member, wrote in the Seattle Times last week: “If these reforms are not the best that can be done for the American people, then Congress and the president must tell us what is better.”

Reforming the nation’s intelligence system isn’t something the nation should rush into, and calling Congress back for an emergency session isn’t necessary because members have no specific plan to consider.

However, that itself is damning. The problems were obvious before the 9-11 attacks. A few years back, the Scowcroft Commission recommended reform, but it was ignored. A bipartisan congressional report found many of the same problems as the 9-11 commission.

Our nation’s leaders need to get to work on this. Now. There is no greater priority. The current culture of “need to know” must be replaced by “need to share.”

The 9-11 commission said it couldn’t be sure whether better intelligence would’ve headed off the terrorist strikes on U.S. soil, but there’s no excuse if another attack slips pass the guardians of the status quo.