In the end, President George W. Bush and his backers fell victim to a concept they despise: political correctness. The president and his team, in and out of the White House, believed that the Iraqis were just like ourselves; that they were a reasonable people, yearning to be free.

It is a tenet of politically correct thinking, reaching back to the days of the 18th-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that all people, put in the same circumstance, will react similarly.

In a flash of idealism, the Bush war planners believed that Iraqis harbored the same passion for freedom as Western Europeans and Americans. The evidence today is that they harbored an enormous desire to settle ancient scores in the bloodiest and most futile way.

The civil war that rages in Iraq – and has yet to be acknowledged by the Bush administration – equals in savagery anything that was seen in the Balkans or in Africa. Not only do the Shiites and Sunnis wish to kill each other, but they must do it in the most barbarous way. Electric drills are the preferred form of torture – mindless torture, because its only purpose is pain.

It is fashionable among both Democrats and Republicans to blame the execution of the war for the disastrous situation in Iraq. To a point. But the execution of the war has nothing to do with the scale and cruelty of the civil strife in Iraq. That is the Iraqis’ affair. Ultimately, some resolution has to be found among the Iraqis.

There is a pattern to these things: First, a wave of violence, intermittent reconciliation, waves of new atrocities, and finally a peace bred of fatigue as much as amity. There is no way that American forces can referee such a conflict.

The British were able to play referee in the 18th and 19th centuries, but it cannot be done again. The reason is the proliferation of small arms and explosives. The British could keep peace between Hindus and Muslims in India, because the British owned the firepower. Likewise in Africa.

Those days have gone forever. RPGs, explosives of all kinds and automatic weapons have changed global peacekeeping and empire-building.

Here in Washington, we are waiting for the Baker-Hamilton commission to provide a strategic way out of Iraq. Expectations exceed probabilities.

The commission is unlikely to get any facts that are not widely known. It is also unlikely, because of the closeness between Baker and Bush, to come up with recommendations that do not have consideration for the president’s views and performance. What the commission can do is force the administration to forget romanticized dreams of democracy.

We have two pressing concerns: to get our troops out of Iraq and to avoid handing the Middle East over to Iran. If the Iraqis wish to kill each other with the most fiendish excesses, it is up to the Arab League to intervene, not the United States.

The change in Iraq policy will not be masterminded by James Baker, but by Robert Gates, the designated secretary of Defense. Gates knows the territory. He knows the public is sick of the bloodshed on our watch. The exit strategy has to come from Gates, who then must coax Bush into accepting it.