Imagine for a moment that the United States had used a different military tactic to drive militants out of Baghdad during the “surge” last year. Instead of pursuing Gen. David Petraeus’ counterinsurgency strategy, the military had ringed the city with heavy artillery and fired at will to drive the insurgents out, while advanced fighter jets and helicopter gunships fired hundreds of missiles into residential areas.

Imagine the carnage. You can picture many thousands of residents fleeing the city. No military would pursue a brutal and foolhardy strategy like that, right?

Think again. That’s exactly how the Pakistani army is fighting the Taliban in the Swat Valley and surrounding communities. That’s why Pakistan’s government reported on Tuesday that more than 1 million residents of the areas under attack have run for their lives since the offensive began last week. Antonio Guterres, the U.N. high commissioner for refugees, declared a refugee crisis in Pakistan and described the situation as “a huge and rapidly unfolding emergency which is going to require considerable resources beyond those that currently exist in the region.”

Pakistani newspapers have offered only scattered reports of civilian casualties; journalists are not allowed into the area. The Dawn, Islamabad’s English-language paper, noted, for example, that “in Buner district, one minor was killed and another suffered injuries when a mortar shell hit a residence.” But the paper also reported the military’s claimed body counts.

“At least 44 militants were killed when jet fighters, helicopter gunships and artillery shelled different areas in Swat, Dir and Malakand,” the paper reported. So much for counterinsurgency.

Should Americans expect better? Of course. During the Bush administration, the United States spent more than $10 billion to train and equip the military so that it could pursue an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas. That was money flushed down the drain. As if the Pentagon had not learned a thing, last month the Defense Department announced a new, $3 billion plan to train and equip Pakistan’s military.

The money is to be spent on counterinsurgency training and equipment, such as night-vision goggles. Perhaps you saw some of the TV reports from Baghdad last year showing American troops creeping around dangerous street corners in Baghdad at night, looking for insurgents through the greenish screens of their night-vision goggles.

Well, in Pakistan, soldiers would use those expensive American goggles to find their way to the ammunition boxes so they could reload their artillery pieces.

In one sense Pakistan’s strategy is not too surprising. The army’s all-encompassing preoccupation is the next war with India, should it ever come. No soldier or officer is admired or promoted except for achievements related to that theoretical conflict. In fact, while the Taliban were seizing control of the Buner district last month, coming to within 70 miles of the capital, the bulk of Pakistan’s forces remained at the southeastern border with India, poised for the possibility of attack.

As the district fell to the Taliban, not a single soldier budged. They behaved as if the problem was occurring in some other country. Only an international outcry – and the realization that President Asif Ali Zardari would have to defend himself when he met with President Barack Obama the following week – finally provoked the army to act.

Last week, Richard Holbrooke, the special envoy to the region, found himself in an uncomfortable position, trying to defend Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy before hostile members of Congress. Gary Ackerman, a Democrat from New York, asked him how on earth an F-16 fighter jet could be used as a counterinsurgency weapon.

Holbrooke said, “I am told by F-16 pilots that F-16s with modern avionics can be used as a counterinsurgency tool, but quite honestly, it requires very sophisticated training. They did use aging F-16s in the battles in Swat.” In other words, the planes did not have up-to-date avionics, and the pilots were not properly trained.

Pakistan’s army is attacking insurgents embedded in their own cities in the same way they would go after advancing Indian troops because that is all they have ever been trained to do. What’s more, Pakistani generals have been clear that they will not move substantial numbers of their troops from the border unless India offers security assurances.

Those generals ought to think this through. If substantial parts of Pakistan fall to the Taliban, placing the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal at risk, what do you think India might do then?